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A UNIFIED CORPS OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES IS NOT
NEEDED
NORMAN ZANKEL·
I.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction of bills to establish a nationwide Corps of Federal
Administrative Law Judges· has rekindled debate over the efficacy
of, and need for, the sweepiilg changes which apparently will attend
enactment. The bills are endorsed by the Federal Administrative
Law Judges Conference (FAUC), a professional association which
represents, and admits to membership, all federally-employed ad
miilistrative law judges. 2
Many of the affected judges believe that no cogent reasons have
been advanced that demonstrate a need to establish such a COrpS. 3
Principally, the bills are designed to iilsure administrative law
judges' decisional iildependence. 4 It is asserted, however, that the
existiilg statutes and judicial perception of federal administrative law
• Administrative Law Judge, National Labor Relations Board. A.B., Syracuse
University, 1951; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law, 1954.
The opinions of the author are his own. They do not necessarily represent the views
of members of the National Labor Relations Board or any member of the Board's staff.
This anicle has not been reveiwed or approved by the National Labor Relations Board.
1. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3539, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
see also 129 CONGo REC. S6609-IO (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
2. 129 CONGo REc. S66l0 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
3. Approximately 820 of the total federal complement of approximately 1150 ad
ministrative law judges are employed by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Id
The results of a survey conducted among the Federal Administrative Law Judges Con
ference membership have been cited as a claim that the corps bills are favored by a large
majority of present incumbent judges. The poll's results are deceptive. 357 judges re
sponded to the survey. Seventy-six voted against supponing the legislation. While 281
judges voted to suppon it, 205 of such votes were cast by SSA judges. It is clear the
disputes, discussed infra text accompanying note 69, between these judges and their
agency distoned the survey's results. Disregarding the votes cast by SSA judges would
result in seventy-six judges in suppon of and seventy judges against the corps. See Ad
ministratille Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Suhcomm. on Adminis
tratille Practice and Procedure ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
175, 189-90 (1983) (statement of Joseph B. Kennedy, Chairman, Ad Hoc Comm. of Ad
ministrative Law Judges) [hereinafter cited as HelUings on S. 1275).
4. 129 CONGo REc. S6609-10 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
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judges comprise satisfactory and sufficient guarantees of such
independence.
This article will (1) summarize the proposed legislation; (2) de
velop the current status of administrative law judges; and (3) analyze
the reasons proferred in support of the corps and demonstrate their
inadequacy.
II.

BACKGROUND--THE CORPS BILLS

In his floor remarks introducing Senate bill 1275,S Senator
Howell Heflin observed "Administrative law judges are a significant
part of our Federal adjudicatory system." Administrative disputes
should be adjudicated in an independent atmosphere free of bias, in
order to insure fairness and give credence to administrative deci
sions. Structural reform of the administrative law judge system is
necessary to insure truly independent adjudications. 6 The Senator
also stated that his proposal would probably effect cost savings,
achieve efficiencies and improve public perception of administrative
law judges.'
The pending bill creates an "Administrative Law Judge Corps
of the United States."8 Initially, the Corps would consist of all cur
rent federal administrative law judges who would preside over all
Administrative Procedure Act hearings. 9 They could also accept any
other case referred to the Corps by any federal agency or court desir
ing to make a decision based upon a record developed at a hearing
conducted by an administrative law judge. 10
The Corps would be headed by a chief judge appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I I There would
be seven operating divisions, identified by subject area, 12 presumably
to preserve the expertise of the present judges, and each division
would be headed by a presidentially-appointed division chief
5. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). This bill is reprinted at 129 CONGo REc.
S66\O·\3 (dailyed. May 12, 1983). An identical bill, H.R. 3539, 98th Cong., 1st Scss.
(1983), is currently pending in the House of Representatives.
6. 129 CONGo REC' S6609·10 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
7. It!.
8. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c.
§ 562(a».
9. It!. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 562(b». These powers are specified in
5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (1982).
10. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 568(a)(3».
11. It!. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 563(a».
12. It!. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(b)(1)-(7».
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judge.13 The bill establishes a five-member judicial nominating
commission to submit names of qualified candidates for the posi
tions of chief and division chief judges. 14 The number of divisions
could be increased by the council, which would consist of the Corps'
chief judge and the division chief judges, to a maximum of ten and
decreased to not less than four divisions. IS Additionally, the Council
would have authority over appointment, assignment, transfers and
reassignment of judges to the various divisions; and to prescribe
rules of practice and procedure for conduct of proceedings and busi
ness before the COrpS.16 Finally, the bill contains procedures for re
moval and discipline of administrative law judges. 17 A Complaints
Resolution Board, comprised of two judges from each substantive
division and elected by the judges of each division, would receive
complaints of misconduct. 18 After investigation, the Board could is
sue advisory recommendations to the Council which, in tum, could
file charges against judges with the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).19 The MSPB, after an opportunity for a hearing on the
record, could remove and discipline judges for misconduct, incom
petence, neglect of duty, or for physical or mental disability.20
There have been earlier efforts to separate administrative law
judges from the government agencies who currently employ them.
In 1941, such a proposal was studied and rejected. 21 In 1955, the
Hoover Commission proposed separation. 22 In 1973, FADC recom
mended such separation to the Civil Service Commission. 23 The
LaMacchia Commission report suggested study of the feasibility of a
corps in 1974;24 and in 1976 a corps concept was advocated by Ber
nard G. Segal, former president of the American Bar Association. 2s
13. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(a».
14. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(a».
IS. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(a».
16. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565).
17. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569).
18. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(c), (d».
19. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(1).
20. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(a)(I)-(2».
21. Arr'y GENEJlAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1941).
22. HOOVER COMM'N ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, LEGAL
SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 87-88 (1955).
23. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE
STUDY OF THE UnLlZAnON OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LAMACCHIA COMM'N
REPORT) app. (1974).
24. Id at 47, 51.
25. Segal, Th~ AdministroJiv~ Law Judg~: Thirl)' Y~ars of Progr~ss ami th~ Road
Ahead, 62 A.B.A.J. 1424, 1425 (1976).
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In 1981, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, now Research Director of the Adminis
trative Conference of the United States, proposed an experimental
pilot program for a corps into which judges of seventeen specified
federal agencies would be transferred. 26
III.

ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL

1275

One of the arguments advanced in favor of the Corps is that the
legislation will serve to correct misconceptions of administrative law
judges. An examination of legislative, judicial and public perception
of administrative law judges is instructive. 27
A. The Real and Perceived Independence of Administrative Low
Judges-Functions and Responsibilities
The principal focus of the cited studies and recommendations is
decisional independence. Impliedly, at least, an independent corps
of administrative law judges is a panacea. Undoubtedly administra
tive law judges' independence is necessary and public perception of
administrative justice needs enhancement. 28 The bill as drafted,
however, will not provide the correct vehicle to achieve those
purposes.
Federal administrative law judges deal with matters that have
an impact on virtually every phase of the national economy and our
daily lives. They preside over cases involving bank mergers; labor
management relations; nuclear, oil, electric and gas energy alloca
tion and rates; consumer products; social security benefits claims;
worker's compensation; health and safety in mining and industry;
interstate trade; securities regulation; international trade; communi
cations; food and drugs; and a host of other matters. 29
The administrative law judges serve as trial judges. 30 They
presently are assigned to a myriad of federal independent and execu
tive branch agencies which enforce or regulate federal laws. When
they preside at hearings, these judges have authority to: (I) adminis
26. Lubbers, A Unified Corps 0/ ALJs: A Proposal 10 Tes/lhe Idea allhe Federal
Level, 6S JUDICATURE 266, 275-76 (1981).
27. See 129 CONGo REc. S6610 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hedin).
28. Address by Senator Howell Hedin to American Bar Association, Institute of
Judicial Administration (July 30, 1983).
29. Id
30. S U.S.c. § SS6(b)(3) (1982). There is a functional difference, however, between
the SSA judges and the remainder of the federal administrative law judge complement.
Hearings conducted by the former essentially are non-adversarial and not required to
conform to the Administrative Procedure Act. The latter group conduct adversarial
hearings.
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ter oaths and affirmations; (2) issue subpoenas; (3) rule upon offers of
proof and receive relevant evidence; (4) take or cause the taking of
depositions; (5) hold pre-hearing conferences for settlement or sim
plification of issues; (6) regulate the course of the hearing; (7) dispose
of procedural requests; (8) question witnesses; (9) consider the facts
in the record and the arguments and contentions made, or questions
involved; (10) determine credibility and make findings of facts and
conclusions oflaw; and (11) take any actions authorized by agency
rule consistent with provisions of the United States Code, Title 5. 31
1.

Judicial Perception

Administrative law judges are vested with no less responsibility
for maintaining the integrity of our judicial system than the judges
commissioned pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitu
tion. The Supreme Court, in 1978, recognized in Bu/Z v. Econo
mou,32 that administrative law judges are "functionally comparable"
to judges employed in the judicial branch and conferred on them
absolute immunity for judicial acts. 33 In doing so, the Court ob
served: ''There can be little doubt that the role of the . . . adminis
trative law judge is 'functionally comparable' to that of a
[constitutional] judge. His powers are often, if not generally, compa
rable to those of a trial judge. . . ."34
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. ,35 again
commented upon the role of these judges. The Court observed that
the independent administrative law judge is one ''whose impartiality
serves as the ultimate guarantee of a fair and meaningful proceeding
in our constitutional regime."36
More recently, United States Court of Appeals Judge Aldisert,
in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp. ,37 took
the time to enunciate the rationale for viewing administrative law
judges as unique and highly-respectable decision-makers. Judge Al
disert wrote:
Accepting for purposes of argument that to be impartial
judges must be independent of all political or employment pres
sures, I submit that the view that the [administrative law judges]
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Id at 512·13.
Id at 513.
446 U.S. 238 (1980).
Id at 250.
657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981).
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are not sufficiently independent or competent is now so shopworn
as to be totally obsolete. To the contrary, [administrative law
judges], though not yet annointed with life tenure, enjoy an inde
pendence that in my view is plainly sufficient to satisfy reasonable
doubts.
For example, although [administrative law judges] are con
sidered agency personnel, they are selected by the Office of Per
sonnel Management (OPM) independently of any agency
recommendation or rating, 5 U.S.C. § 5362, and cannot be re
moved from office without a hearing establishing good cause
before the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
Their pay is controlled by the Civil Service Commission. [Admin
istrative law judges] can be disqualified from a case only upon
petition by either the agency or a private party. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
Similarly, cases are assigned on a rotating basis so that the agency
cannot "fix" the result by choice of judge. 5 U.S.C. § 3105. They
are not subject to the whim of the agency.. [Administrative law
judges] are strictly independent of investigative or prosecutorial
personnel in the agency. 5 U.S.c. § 554(d).
Moreover, the selection process for [administrative law
judges] should inspire more respect for this office than is generally
extended by Article III judges; it is a process that requires rigorous
inquiries into the background and competence of the candidates.
Applicants must supply twenty professional references. A mini
mum seven years of litigation experience is required to meet the
threshhold selection requirement. A test opinion must be drafted
and evaluated on the basis of many factors including clarity and
conciseness. . . . Finally. after the various scores have been com
bined. applicants considered tentatively eligible are interviewed
by a special panel usually composed of an OPM official, an attor
ney qualified in the field of administrative law, and an agencyoffi
cial. This committee submits a recommendation to the director of
OPM who makes final eligibility determinations among qualified
candidates. Once appointed to an agency, an [administrative law
judge] is not subjected to the usual probationary employment pe
riod for agency employees, further insuring [administrative law
judge] independence. 5 U.S.C. § 3321. ...
The rigors of the selection procedure and the statutory pro
tections of [administrative law judge] independence suggest to me
that the federal judiciary need not look down its collective nose at
[administrative law judge] decisions. 38

38. Id. at 527-28.
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2. Congressional Perception
Congress has recognized the need of administrative law judges
to possess decisional independence. Relevant legislative history
demonstrates Congress's concern for preservation of those judges'
independence from influences, especially agency influences, that
might in any way reduce that independence. 39 That concept was em
bodied as a major reform within the federal Administrative Proce
dure Act (APA).40 Congress took as its mission the assurance of
fairness in the full range of administrative action affecting the public.
It was especially concerned with the trial-type hearing which came to
be governed by sections 5 through 8 of the APA.41 It recognized a
need to allay public "suspicions . . . that the submittals of private
parties are not fully considered, that the views of agency personnel
are emphasized without opportunity for private parties to meet them,
and that matters outside the record are often the real grounds for
decision."42
Prior to the APA's enactment, Congress had before it a system
in which administrative trials were held before agency employe,es,
subject to agency control respecting classification pay, promotion
and tenure; individuals in a "dependent status."43 ''There were no
reliable safeguards to ensure the objectivity and judicial capability of
presiding officers. . . . [T]he power of the agencies to control and
influence such personnel made questionable the contention of any
agency that its proceedings assured fundamental fairness."44 There
was no statutory professional corps of administrative law judges.
Agencies could assign employees to preside over a trial one day, and
administer a program the next.
Congress addressed these concerns in enacting section 11 of the
APA.4S It vested the judges46 with the duty to exclusively preside at
39. See AlT'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINIS
TRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 272
(1941).
40. 5 U.S.C. II 551-559,701-706, 1305,3105,3344,6362, 7562 (1982).
41. ATT'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1941).
42. Id. quoted in Mac:y, TIre APA IlIId the Hearing Examiner: Products of Q Viable
Political Sockty, 27 FED. 8J. 351, 354 n.7 (1967).
43. Ramspcck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 130 (1953).
44. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judici
1lT)', 33 AD. L. REv. 109, III (1981).
45. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 11,60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.c.
§ 7521 (1982»; see Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1980).
46.

The hearing examiner title was changed administratively to"Administrative
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trial-type hearings; and made their compensation outside of agency
control. Administrative law judges became subject to removal only
for good cause, after a hearing on the record, subject to judicial re
vieW'l7-a procedural right unique to federal civil servants serving
under Article I of the Constitution. 48 All other federal employees
are removable prior to hearing and must pursue their hearing and
review rights after their employment ceases. 49
Section 11 drew upon ''the more ancient wisdom grounded in
history and contained in Article III, which safeguards federal judi
cial independence through still more stringent compensation and
tenure provisions."5o Just as the independent judiciary was "struc
turally insulated from the other branches to provide a safe haven for
individual liberties in times of crisis,"5l so Congress intended admin
istrative law judges to act as a bulwark for administrative litigants,
as "a critical check on potentially excessive or unauthorized regula
tion."s2 Within their sphere, the judges were given a role "function
ally comparable" to that of a federal trial judge.53 These provisions
were the very heart and sole of the new act. 54
The APA's guarantee of independence not only recognized the
unique status of administrative law judges within the executive
branch, but also invested their decisions with authority earlier with
held by reviewing courts, who had considered the judges as "not suf
ficiently independent or competent" to deserve deference. 55
By 1953, the Supreme Court had noted the new guarantees of
administrative law judges' independence: Congress intended to pro
vide tenure for hearing examiners within Civil Service concepts. S6
They were not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at the whim or
Law Judge" in 1971, see 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1982), and was later adopted by Congress.
Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §§ 2,3,92 Stat. 183, 183-84.
47. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § II, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,701-706, 1305,3105,3344,6362,7562).
48. Id
49. See 5 U.S.c. § 7513 (1982); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1974).
50. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980); see Bu/Z, 438 U.S. at 514;
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953).
51. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. Hearings 011 H.R. 6768 Before tile House Comm. 011 Post OJlice aNi Civil Sen
ice, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1980) (statement of Christopher McNaughton).
53. Bu/Z, 438 U.S. at 513.
54. See Bu/Z, 438 U.S. at 514; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 51-53
(1950); see also Zwerdling, RejlectiollS 011 tile Role ojQII Administrative Low Judge, 25 AD.
L. REv. 9, 13 (1973).
55. PermQllellt Label Corp., 657 F.2d at 527.
56. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953).
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caprice of the agency or for political reasons. 57
In addition to these provisions, the APA prohibits administra
tive law judges from engaging in exparle communications regarding
facts in issue unless all parties are notified and given an opportunity
to participate in those discussions; prevents supervision by someone
who performs investigative or prosecutorial functions in their agen
cies; and proscribes review of administrative law judges' decisions by
agency personnel who performed investigative or prosecutorial ac
tivities in the particular case under review. 58
Congress, in some areas, has provided even greater assurances
of administrative law judges' independence. For example, the Fed
eral Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and the Occupa
tional Safety and Health Review Commission contain separate corps
ofjudges whose decisions are final, subject only to discretionary ap
pellate review by those Commissions. 59 The review standard im
posed on the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
is the same as that which Article III courts apply to the Commission
itself.60 Additionally, the National Labor Relations Act expressly
provides for strict separation of the NLRB General Counsel and his
staff from the five-member Board, its staff and the administrative law
judges assigned to that agency.61
3.

Public Perception

This element is the most difficult to evaluate. Its components
are varied and derive from a variety of factors. Judicial and legisla
tive pronouncements affect the public view of administrative law
judges, and media reports of these judge-conducted hearings also
have an impact.
The most accurate reftection of public perception should ema
nate from personal confrontations between individual citizens and
administrative law judges. Because the confrontations are few, the
manner in which the public perceives administrative law judges is
principally dependent upon the reports of the administrative judici
ary received from legal practitioners and other on-the-scene observ
ers. The available evidence, admittedly sparse, tends to demonstrate
57. Id.
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1982).
59. 30 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West Supp. 1983); 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(i) (West Supp. 1983).
60. Donovan ex Tel Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86, 90-92 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (findings by the Commission's administrative law judges are final and conclusive).
61. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983).
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that administrative law judges generally enjoy a positive position in
the administrative process.
There are references to administrative law judges as the "hidden
judiciary."62 Ostensibly, that characterization connotes a negative
aura. It is equally susceptible, however, to the opposite conclusion.
It readily imparts a feeling that these judges are performing their
functions at acceptable levels. The absence of a public display of
dissatisfaction, except regarding the Social Security Administra
tion,63 with the performance of the administrative process is rather
compelling evidence that administrative law judges presently dis
pense judicious, fair, objective and competent administrative justice.
It does not matter that individual members of the public are una
ware of the distinction between administrative law, or other, judges.
To them, anyone invested with the title "judge" has certain plenary
authority. The fine distinctions between judges are irrelevant.
Two examples of public perception are noteworthy. Both exam
ples were presented to the Senate subcommittee which conducted
hearings on Senate bill 1275 on September 20, 1983. When present
ing the views of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), Althea T. L. Simmons, NAACP Wash
ington D.C. Bureau Director commented: "In our opinion, the idea
that the independence of Administrative Law Judges is compro
mised by their relationship with a particular agency, past or present,
is without merit."64 In a similar vein, Judge Joseph B. Kennedy of
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, testified:
at a recent meeting of the Committee on Practice and Procedure
before the National Labor-Relations Board of the Section of La
bor and Employment Law of the American Bar Association, a
group composed of both management and union labor law practi
tioners. Those present virtually unanimously expressed their op
position to establishment of a corps of administrative law judges.
If there were any real indications that administrative law judges
are not independent of the agencies whose cases they hear, the
attorneys who practice before the agencies would have been the
first to seek changes in the present system. 65
62. U.S. News & World Report, Nov. I, 1982, at 56; Rich, emtro! Panels ofAdmin
istrative La.., Judges: An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE 233, 233 (1981); Lubbers, supra
note 44, at 109.
63. See infra text accompanying note 69.
64. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 163 (statement of Althea T. L. Simmons,
Director, Wash. Bureau, NAACP).
65. Id. at 179 (statement of Hon. Joseph B. Kennedy).
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I echo these remarks. Those who argue that public perception needs
improvement are guided by a base of an inherently fallacious as
sumption that the existing system engenders its broad disdain. There
simply is no evidence that this assumption is correct. The informa
tion available relative to the approximately nineteen federal admin
istrative agencies, other than the Social Security Administration
(SSA) does not support such an assumption.
4.

Summary

The courts accord administrative law judges and their decisions,
deference and respect.66 Congress has consistently pursued a course
which is designed to afford maximum assurance of decisional inde
pendence and special status to administrative law judges.67 They
have been well-insulated from agency influence by statute. 68 The
public appears satisfied with their performance. There simply has
been no substantive argument or data presented that requires legisla
tive action to improve perceptions of the administrative judiciary.

B. Decisional Independence
In the backdrop of legislative and judicial protection provided,
the argument that the bill provides greater decisional independence
to administrative law judges wanes. There are no new indicia of au
tonomy contained in those bills.
The independence which is substantive and critical is the exist
ence of freedom to find facts and render a decision based upon a
judge's personal assessment of the facts and law without fear of re
taliation or discrimination based on the resulting conclusions and
decisions.
The issue of decisional independence was resolved by enact
ment of the APA. Other existing statutes, and civil service regula
tions effectively form the tools by which to recognize that
independence and the special status of administrative law judges.
What is needed is strict implementation of those mandates; not a
change in them.
Only one example of possible improper agency interference has
been cited. That is, the nascent situation in SSA. In that agency, the
judges have complained that they are being SUbjected to improper
pressures to deny disability benefits by the imposition of production
66. See suprQ text accompanying notes 32-38.
67. See suprQ notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
68. See suprQ notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
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quotas, and by the conduct of unauthorized performance appraisals
which result in unfounded disciplinary action against them. 69
The concerns of the SSA judges are clearly legitimate. Their
allegations, alone, clearly tend to undermine public confidence in the
administrative judiciary. If true, those allegations seriously detract
from the critical elements of decisional independence which Con
gress has taken decades to develop.
However, problems of SSA judges apparently are unique to
them. During the Senate hearings on Senate bill 1275 on June 23
and September 20, 1983,70 several witnesses appeared and testified.
No evidence was presented to show judicial, legislative or public
concern that the present administrative process is unfair, except
within SSA. If the SSA judges' complaints are justifiable, they arise
from their functional differences from other judges, and also SSA's
failure to apply the existing administrative law judges protections to
its judges; and not from the absence of statutes which prescribe inde
pendence. If the APA, and other relevant statutes and regulations,
are being ignored in agencies other than SSA, it was incumbent
upon the proponents of the Corps to produce such evidence. The
failure to do so, belies the claim that there is a generalized lack of
decisional independence.
Solution of any problems which may exist within SSA does not
depend upon enactment of Senate bill 1275. Two bills, Senate bill
1911 71 and House resolution 3541,72 are pending which directly ad
dress those problems. Senate bill 1911 is entitled a bill "to ensure
the independence of certain administrative law judges."73 The bill
proposes to establish a separate new Health and Human Services
Review Commission, patterned after the legislation which governs
the Occupational Health and Safety and Federal Mine Safety Re
view Commissions. 74 The bill proposes transfer of all SSA judges to
the new commission, effectively removing them from their present
condition by which they are subject to executive and administrative
supervision. 7 !! The SSA judges' professional organization has urged
favorable action on this bill. In the absence of empirical information
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
(1976 &;
75.

See, e.g., Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
The author personally attended the hearings.
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
Id.
S. 1911, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
Compare id willi 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976 &; Supp. V 1981) and 30 U.S.C. § 823
Supp. V 1981).
S. 1191, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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that administrative law judges' independence is threatened in other
agencies, it clearly is more efficient and appropriate for Congress to
concentrate on methods of solving such problems where they exist
than to interrupt a system, developed by careful deliberation and
proved successful by experience, where there is no attack upon the
judges' independence.
The administrative law judges assigned to the independent com
missions such as the Federal Mine Safety Review Commission and
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission suffer no patent problems
of interference with independence. They all apparently function
well under the existing statutory scheme. Thus, to ameliorate
whatever problem exists regarding independence of the judges, Con
gress need only establish the Health and Human Services (HHS) Re
view Commission. That move, alone, would provide the SSA judges
with the safeguards of independence presently enjoyed by all other
federal administrative law judges. In this context, there is no need to
make structural changes in the administrative judiciary. Establish
ment of the HHS Review Commission provides the solution to the
solitary, vexing issue of administrative law judges' independence. It
would be directly responsive to the arguments that any real threat to
independence exists, without disrupting the adequate operations of
administrative law judges pursuant to the APA.
IV.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Senate bill 1275 raises other issues that require examination. In
their totality, they show that the bill, in its present form, should not
be enacted.
A. Administrative Law Judge Expertise

Clearly, a goal of the legislation is to have a group of adminis
trative law judges who are able to conduct hearings of all types. The
bill, however, also recognizes the importance of maintaining exper
tise in certain areas of the law. The seven enumerated substantive
divisions are designed to retain the need for specialization. 76
The bill's design is flawed. First, preservation of expertise is
only symbolic. As earlier noted, the Corps' divisions are tempo
rary.77 Their number is subject to fluctuation at the whim of the
76. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 564(b)(I)-(7».
77. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(b».
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council78 and they are subject to change immediately upon enact
ment.'9 Second, the subject-matter groupings within the divisions is
contrary to the purported aim of expertise preservation. Some of the
divisions contain such an amalgam of substantive legal subjects that
would require judges expert in one area of the division to undertake
extensive training to become competent in another subject. 80
For example, the Division of General Programs is designed to
hear cases currently heard by administrative law judges assigned to
the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Merit Systems Pro
tection Board. These areas are plainly unrelated to one another.
The former involves regulation and control of potentially dangerous
drugs, while the latter deals with labor relations problems between
federal employees and their employers. Their substantive underpin
nings are patently dissimilar. Each area contains wholly separate
specialized and technical knowledge.
It is not suggested that most of the present administrative law
judges are not sufficiently endowed with an ability to conduct com
plete, fair and impartial hearings and issue decisions in both areas.
Yet certainly, such transitions will not be easy. A system requiring
study and re-education is inefficient and contrary to the fundamental
goal of the administrative law system. Separate agencies were estab
lished by Congress precisely to assure the development and mainte
nance of entities imbued with a high level of expertise in specialized
legal subjects. A merger of certain areas with others diminishes the
congressional intent and operational features which have withstood
the tests of time and experience. Needed expertise could be improp
erly diverted if the Corps' Council, in its wisdom, were to make sub
stantial changes in the composition of the divisions by contraction.
NAACP spokeswoman Simmons told the senators at the September,
1983 hearings that
[O]ne of the more troubling aspects of [Senate bill] 1275 is the
destructive impact it would have upon the level of expertise pos
sessed by [administrative law judges]. . . . Aside from the initial
assignment of current [administrative law judges] to divisions,
there is no requirement that [they] be assigned to the division in
which they possess expertise. . . .
Our legal system, both judicial and administrative, is becom
ing increasingly more complex and without [administrative law
78. Id
79. Id
80. See id
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judges] experienced in the specific area of the law ... [the public]
... is apt to suffer. . . . [W]ithout an experienced [administra
tive law judge] familiar with the purposes the particular legislation
was intended to accomplish, the subtle nuances of the law, the
elements of the various legal doctrines that apply, and what infor
mation must be elicited to apply those doctrines, those least ahle to
secure experienced, usually more expensive, representation will
suffer. One of the prices paid for a 'generalist' judge is the heavy
burden which falls upon the parties to 'educate' the judge. 81

Malcolm Rich, while employed as a research attorney at the
American Judicature Society, cogently observed that whether ad
ministrative law judge specialized expertise is necessary "probably
depends on the type of case-·a rate-making proceeding may require
more technical expertise than a case involving eligibility for
benefits. "82
The tenuous existence of the seven divisions contained in Senate
bill 1275 reduces the opportunity for fair consideration of the nature
and type of cases as a factor in utilization of expertise. Assignment
of hearing priorities and transfer ofjudges among the divisions is left
to the Council's discretion. 83 The most well-intentioned implemen
tation of that authority could impede enforcement of laws by as
signing judges out of their areas of expertise to divisions which the
Council has deemed to require priority action.
Redistribution and realignment of judges in such circumstances
could conceivably be detrimental to agencies that must hear and de
cide cases under a particular statute. If agencies lose control of their
enforcement obligations, the provisions of Senate bill 1275 which
purportedly preserve expertise become illusory.
B. Cost Effectiveness
It has been urged that a unified corps will result in substantial
cost savings and efficiencies. That assertion is undocumented. No
cost analysis apparently has been made or presented. Instead, this
bare assertion is drawn from recent experience among some states
which have adopted central panel systems. In particular, the signifi
81. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 162-63 (statement of Althea T. L. Sim
mons) (emphasis in original).
82. Rich, Adapting tlte Central Panel System: A Su"ey ofSeven States, 65 JUDICA
TURE 246, 253 (1981).
83. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565(d».
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cant cost savings made in Minnesota have been cited.84
During testimony at the June, 1983 Senate hearings, Duane R.
Harves, Minnesota Chief Hearing Examiner, conceded "it has been
somewhat difficult to determine the actual cost savings .. ."8S
achieved by operation of a central panel system. He stated that sig
nificant cost savings were realized from centralization of the Minne
sota hearing officers into an office independent of the agencies it
services. 86 Nonetheless, it is difficult to fully assess how much of the
savings are directly attributable to centralization. Mr. Harves stated
that Minnesota realized a ten percent reduction in the office caseload
since the central panel system was installed. 87 That reduction di
rectly resulted from legislative budget cutting. 88 Another thirty-five
percent reduction in caseload was ascribed to legislation which re
duced the number of hearings required to be held. 89 Mr. Harves
cited actual cost reductions, in dollar amounts, in certain enumer
ated state agencies. None exceeded fifty percent. 90 Assuming the
forty-five percent caseload drop results in an equal percentage of
cost reduction, the total cost decrease is not as substantial as her
alded by the proponents of Senate bill 1275. Moreover, the cost of
operating the new centralized office does not appear to have been
factored into the statistics of the reductions discussed. The addition
of those sums undoubtedly would further diminish the overall
amount of reduced costs evolving from the Minnesota consolidation.
Malcolm Rich observed, regarding costs of central panel sys
tems, that there is a "striking . . . lack of hard data on budgetary
issues [and] ... most views on the budgetary issue are not based on
financial studies; necessary data is often unavailable."91 Those ob
servations were made in 1981. Today, more specific fiscal data
surely is available. It is unclear whether any effort has been made to
search for such information. Mr. Harves' Senate remarks, two years
after Mr. Rich's observations demonstrate that more recent, though
not altogether complete, statistics are available. The seemingly in
sufficient investigation into this area cannot be used in support of the
legislation. Those who advocate enactment of Senate bill 1275 bear
84. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 84-90 (statement of Hon. Duane R.
Harves, Minnesota Chief Administrative Law Judge).
85. Id at 85.
86. Id at 87.
87. Id at 88.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Id at 87.
91. Rich, supra note 82, at 250.
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the burden of producing evidence to support their contentions, or
explain why it is not feasible.
In the face of an attempt to effect the widespread reorganization
contemplated by Senate bill 1275, in the posture of an existing fed
eral system virtually free of major criticism (except in SSA), reftec
tive study and analysis should precede action on the Corps' bill. To
date, a paucity of probative financial evidence has been produced. 92
Surely, the diverse and important interests at stake in federal admin
istrative proceedings deserve more deliberate study to enable the
making of the most accurate conclusion whether or not a unified fed
eral administrative law judge corps actually will achieve cost reduc
tions. This issue should not be resolved by mere rhetoric of
interested participants.
C. Improved Efficiency
Another argument submitted to support Senate bill 1275 is that
it will foster more efficient operation of the administrative process
and increase ftexibility in assignment ofjudges to cases. It is asserted
that a corps will enable "better correlation to the various peaks and
valleys of individual agency caseloads and would eliminate agency
overstaffing to meet surges of adjudicative activities in order to avoid
backlogs and constituent complaints."93 As with the cost-savings is
sue, no documentation was submitted to support this position.
There is some evidence to show that efficiency of operations has
not been a motivational element in establishing judges' corps in state
jurisdictions. It is only an unsupported assumption that an employ
ment relationship between the judges and their agencies will com
promise either decisional independence or the alleged salutary
effects of organizational separation. Only four state central panels
(California, Colorado, Massachusetts and Tennessee) vest assign
ment discretion in the panel director. 94 In other central panel states
(Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey), the director is required to make
hearing assignments based upon the judges' expertise in the subject
92. In 1981, the states of California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Tennessee had some form of central panel in operation. Rich, supra
note 82, at 249. The proponents of S. 1275 presented only the Minnesota experience.
Clearly, the efforts to document cost savings is incomplete.
93. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 27 (statement of Hon. Victor W. Palmer,
Chairman of the Corps Comm. of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference).
94. M. RICH Ik. W. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 50 (1983).
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matter of the proceeding. 9s In other states, each employing agency
that employs administrative law judges retains assignment discre
tion. 96 No evidence has been proffered that the administrative pro
cess has been made more, or less, efficient by the use of any of these
systems.
Also, no documentation was presented to show the present fed
eral procedures lead to overstaffing. In fact, there are safeguards to
protect against the condition. Distribution of judges to agencies is
controlled by Office of Management and Budget and Congress. The
federal agencies must justify their requests for judges to those bodies.
No data has been offered which demonstrate that any agency suffers
an overstaffing problem.
Staff surplus normally is caused by inaccurate caseload forecast
ing. Those prognostications depend upon a variety of factors. Such
external, uncontrollable, factors as the nation's economic climate,
stability and growth of certain industries, human and industrial rela
tions philosophies and practices, national defense posture, research
and development activities, and fiscal policies have an impact upon
their conclusions. These elements contribute to making the present
system subject to error in staffing forecasts.
Nothing in Senate bill 1275 can eliminate the presence of these
forces. How centralization of assignment procedures might control
them is entirely elusive and unexplained.
Regarding the superior efficiency claimed to exist within Senate
bill 1275, it is argued that the Corps would reduce present duplica
tion of support services such as law libraries, case-tracking systems,
administrative and clerical personnel, office space and travel of
fices. 97 That argument bears little merit. Concededly, there may be
some amelioration of existing profusion. The attendant "efficien
cies", however, would be insubstantial and speculative. Currently,
the agencies to which administrative law judges are assigned main
tain the enumerated facilities for the benefit of all agency personnel,
including the judges.98 Senate bill 1275 would do nothing to change
the agencies' need to provide those services to non-administrative
law judges. In reality, Senate bill 1275 merely would effect a transfer
of those functions, as they apply to, and are necessary for, the judges
to the Corps. As earlier noted, all incumbent judges would be trans
95. Id
Id
97. Hearings on S. IllS, supra note 3, at 26 (statement of Hon. Victor W. Palmer).
98. Id
96.
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ferred to the Corps under the scheme of Senate bill 1275. 99 The
judges' support requirements will not vanish. In this context, it is
entirely possible that the transfer of support services would increase,
rather than reduce, overall operational costs and inefficiency.
That a new, patently unwieldy, bureaucracy will emanate from
Senate bill 1275 cannot be ignored. The Corps would initially con
sist of over 1100 judges, over 800 of whom (in SSA) are stationed in
approximately 140 locations throughout the country.lOO Addition
ally, the Corps necessary would have to include law clerks, paralegal
personnel, together with clerical and administrative staffs. It has
been estimated that the entire employee complement of the Corps
would reach 5,000 individuals. lol Management of such numbers of
personnel, most of whom under present conditions are situated in
outposts scattered around the nation, poses self-evident conflicts to a
claim of efficiency. 102
Finally, Senate bill 1275 inherently is inefficient. I have earlier
alluded to the manner in which the operating divisions will be or
ganized. There is an imbalance in administrative law judges com
plement among the substantive divisions. For example, the Division
of General Programs and Grants will include judges now serving in
six agencies (Drug Enforcement Administration, Housing and Ur
ban Development, Food and Drug Administration, Bureau of Alco
hol, Tobacco and Firearms, Postal Service and Merit Systems
Protection Board).103 On October 31, 1982, only ten judges were at
tached to those agencies, in 1010. 104 In contrast, the Division of La
bor Relations (National Labor Relations Board and Federal Labor
Relations Authority) will consist ofjudges from two agencies. lOS On
99. s. 1275 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 562(b».
100. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 3, at 180-81 (statement of Hon. Joseph B.
Kennedy).
101. Id
102. A literal interpretation of S. 1275 demonstrates the magnitude of its inherent
inefficiency. The Corps is to be located "at the seat of Government"; presumably Wash
ington, D.C. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 562(a». Currently, administrative law judges are stationed in widely dispersed areas of
the country or are required to travel throughout the nation from bases in the capital.
Surely, S. 1275 docs not seriously contemplate that each litigant and witness will be re
quired to appear in Washington to be heard. If not, then the potential efficiencies as
serted from consolidation arc imagined.
103. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 3, at 42-43 (statement of Hon. Victor W.
Palmer).
104. Id at 63.
105. Id at 43.
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October 31, 1982, there were 123 judges assigned to those agen
cies; 106 and the Division of Benefits Programs will be formed with
judges of only one agency (SSA),107 to which 820 judges were as
signed on October 31, 1982.108
It has been asserted that a "collegial structure" of management
is established by the bill. 109 A more precise term is "collision" struc
ture. As earlier observed, the chief judge of each of the Corps' sub
stantive divisions will be its managerial body, together with the
Corps' chief judge. I 10 When perceived needs for professional and
non-professional staffing, case-handling priorities, and budgetary re
quirements are evaluated by each of the division chiefs, unavoidable
conflicts will arise. The Council and chief judge are likely to become
preoccupied with matters of internal strife, the unravelling of which
will be dictated by the imbalance of power implied by the sheer nu
merical comparisons of judges' complement and caseload within the
competing divisions.
Currently, each agency is able to establish its own priorities rel
ative to the performance of its special statutory mandates. Except
for the problem within SSA, there are no serious challenges from the
administrative law practitioners or the general public that the agen
cies are not satisfactorily fulfilling their obligations. Viewed in this
light, it seems more efficient to leave the present system undisturbed
than to create an entity with limitless possibilities of fomenting frus
tration, anxiety and enmity.
D. Miscellaneous Claims
It has been urged that independence is questionable because
employing agencies provide their judges with such things as office
space, parking facilities and travel assistance. II I Obviously, those
items are ministerial and administrative in character. It is straining
to use such arguments as proof there is an impediment to decisional
freedom.
Finally, at the June, 1983 Senate hearing, it was suggested that
the bill "provide[s] new means for assisting our overloaded federal
106. Id at 63.
Id at 43.
Id at 63.
Id at 41.
S. 1275, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 565(a».
Ill. Hearings on S. 1175, supra note 3, at 177 (statement of Hon. Joseph B.
Kennedy).
107.
108.
109.
110.
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courts. . at their request." I 12 Senate bill 1275 authorizes federal
courts, as well as agencies, to refer certain types of proceedings to the
COrpS.11l
No evidence was produced to show that the federal courts will
request such assistance. In any event, the possibility that the admin
istrative law judges might render such assistance is not a persuasive
reason to establish the Corps. To be potent, an argument should be
directed to show how the various features of the Corps bills improve
the administrative process.

V.

CONCLUSION

The claimed benefits of Senate bill 1275 are only superficially
appealing. Thoughtful analysis demonstrates their inadequacies.
Insufficient data has been presented to prove a need for an adminis
trative law judge corps. The available evidence shows the present
administrative processes function satisfactorily under the APA.
Congress should not enact Senate bill 1275 or House resolution
3539. Instead, it should take steps to remove the cloud from deci
sional independence in the only place where it has been shown to be
present: SSA. Administrative law judge decisional independence
will be reaffirmed by transfer of SSA judges to a Health and Human
Services Review Commission. The entire administrative judiciary
need not be overhauled. 114
112. Id. at 27 (statement of Hon. Victor W. Palmer).
113. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c.
§ 568(a)(3».
114. On October 5, 1983, Congresswoman Mary Rose Ouar (Chair, House Sub
committee on Compensation and Employee Benefits. Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service), joined by Congressman Clarence Long. introduced H.R. 4090, 98th Cong.• 1st
Sess. (1983). At this writing, the introduction of an identical bill is being considered in
the Senate. H.R. 4090 would transfer administrative law judge pay authority from the
Office of Personnel Management to the Commission of Executive. Legislative and Judi
cial Salaries. Id
The Ouar bill serves to cure a legislative oversight during enactment of the 1978
Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 11. Pub. L. No. 95-454. 92 Stat. 1119 (1978) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105 (1982». Under the 1978 Act, administrative law judges were ex
empt from the performance appraisal. pay bonus. and other provisions applicable to se
nior non-administrative law judge officials. Id § 203(a) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 4301
(1982». This was proper because work appraisals and monetary influences are inconsis
tent with decisional independence. H.R. 4090 removes administrative law judges from
the pay schedules which apply generally to federal career employees. H.R. 4090. 98th
Cong.• 1st Sess. (1983). This bill should be passed in conjunction with the HHS Review
Commission. Its enactment will complement the administrative law judge exclusion
from the Civil Service Reform Act and will signal further cognition of the judicial char
acter and unique status Congress has historically accorded to administrative law judges.
H.R. 4090 is supponed by the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference without
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apparent controversy. Favorable action on that bill will reconfirm congressional intent
to foster independence for administrative law judges.

